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Introduction 
The United Kingdom as a secular, multicultural, democracy aims to tolerate and 
accommodate manifestations of religion. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that those who 
choose to manifest their religion are able to engage in those processes and with those 
institutions through which the state discharges its functions, without requiring those 
manifestations to be compromised (unless necessary for certain, defined, objectives). Such a 
right is currently enshrined within the law of the UK by the incorporation of article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) into primary legislation via the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Where there are competing rights, in the absence of intervention from the 
legislature, it becomes the role of the judiciary to reconcile these conflicts. One such area of 
tension is the right of women of the Muslim faith to wear the face covering referred to as the 
Niqaab. The UK respects the right of women of the Muslim faith to wear the Niqaab in 
public, and unlike some other jurisdictions (such as France1) has not sought to prohibit it. 
There has been judicial consideration (in the House of Lords) of cases where public bodies 
(such as schools) have limited access to their services to those who do not comply with 
certain preconditions, even if those preconditions require the removal of objects or clothing 
believed by the wearer to be a necessary manifestation of religious belief. 2 There is, 
                                                          
1 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 
of Oct. 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public], Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344. 
2 For example, R(Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 
AC 100. 
however, no precedent or legislative guidance as to whether it is permissible to restrict the 
right of an individual to manifest their religion in order to comply with the rules of an 
institution (such as the court system)  that he or she has little or no choice but to engage with. 
Those who are involved in court proceedings often do so under compulsion. In criminal cases 
this is either because, if appearing as defendants, they are required to attend on bail with 
criminal sanctions attached if they do not attend,3 and if attending as witnesses, they can be 
required to attend under the compulsion of a witness summons with the threat of a custodial 
penalty in event of non-compliance.4 In non-criminal matters, an individual who appears as a 
party in litigation does so, often because that is the only means by which they can enforce or 
defend a right afforded to them by the state. When a woman wearing a Niqaab attends court, 
the judiciary have often considered it necessary (either on the request of a party or of their 
own volition) to adjudicate on whether it is appropriate to ask her to remove it or not. This 
could be regarded as being a direct order made by the state to remove the veil in prescribed 
circumstances. In the absence of clear guidance from the legislature, the courts have been 
forced to construct their approach to determining this issue on an ad hoc basis. Although the 
number of cases where this issue has arisen is small it represents, in the public mind, a test of 
how the beliefs of an individual minority faith can influence the evolution of procedures that 
are perceived as being emanations of the state. A, primarily conservative, objection to 
permitting a witness to retain a Niqaab whilst testifying is that it represents the erosion of an 
established hierarchy for the benefit of a minority. A, primarily liberal, objection to 
compelling an individual to remove a Niqaab is that it represents an unwarranted interference 
with an individual’s autonomy for the purposes of absolutism. The conflict in approaches is 
exemplified by the difference in coverage of the issue in articles published in the traditionally 
                                                          
3 Bail Act 1976 (c63) s6. 
4 Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 (c69) s2. 
conservative Daily Telegraph5 and the traditionally socially liberal Guardian newspapers6 - 
the former framing its reporting in terms of judges “banning” the veil in court, the latter as 
“permitting” it. It would however be wrong to categorise this as a purely binary political 
debate as within liberal, and in particular, feminist discourse there is the frequently expressed 
opposition that  veils and masks ‘degrade women by regarding them as primarily sexual 
creatures, but severely controlled ones.’7  In western society arguments surrounding the 
Niqaab are often aligned to wider debates on immigration and national security which further 
politicises and polarises the debate on the subject.8  As Edwards summarises;  
The face veil, more than any other item of clothing or religious or cultural symbol is 
caught in its own web of religious and sectarian struggle and also in a web of politics, 
power and the law. 9 
    In the absence of either legislative guidance or binding precedent, courts have resolved 
questions involving the wearing of the Niqaab on a case by case basis, in a manner which 
suffices to resolve the immediate case being tried before it. Such an approach, whilst pragmatic, 
is unsatisfactory in a common law jurisdiction which places the rule of law at the heart of its 
constitutional foundations, as it creates uncertainty for all parties and avoids clear resolution of 
the matter. This difficulty was recognised by HHJ Murphy who, in September 2013, was 
charged with managing and trying a case where a defendant wished to wear the Niqaab for the 
                                                          
5 Telegraph view, ‘Veils in court are barrier to justice’ The Telegraph (London, 16 September 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/10312765/Veils-in-court-are-abarrier-to-justice.html> 
accessed 25 September 2015. 
6Zoe Williams, ‘Lifting the veil: Do we all have to dance to UKIP’s tune?'The Guardian (London, 20 September 
2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2013/sep/20/zoe-williams-veil-niqaab-personal-choice> 
accessed 25 September 2015. 
7 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Refusing the veil: (Provocations) (1st edition, Biteback Publishing 2014) 14. 
8 K Malik. ‘The random Muslim scare factor generator: separating fact from fiction’ The Guardian (London, 12 
May 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/12/muslim-scare-stories-media-halal-sharia-niqaab> 
Accessed 27 February 2015. 
9 Susan Edwards, ‘Proscribing unveiling – Law: a chimera and an instrument in the political agenda’ in Eva 
Brems ed., The experiences of face veil wearers in Europe and the Law. (Cambridge University Press, 2014) . 
entirety of criminal proceedings brought against her for witness intimidation.10 In a much 
discussed and debated judgment, he concluded that it was a proportionate, and necessary 
limitation on the defendant’s right to manifest her religion, to refuse to allow her to testify in 
her own defence unless she removed her Niqaab (he permitted her to retain it for the remainder 
of the trial). Notwithstanding the fact that this ruling was made by a judge at first instance, it 
has been widely accepted as clearly expressing the approach that courts should take when 
confronted with such an issue.11 Following the ruling Lord Thomas CJ, announced that judges 
needed clear guidance and that a practice direction would be issued for consultation. He 
stressed that ‘the basic principle will be that it will be that it must be for the judge in a case to 
make his (or her) own decision.’12   No such consultation document had been released, from 
which it can be tentatively inferred that there is no significant concern amongst the legislature 
or judiciary about the wider adoption of the approach in R v D. In his 2015 press conference, 
Lord Thomas CJ indicated that although the review was continuing it was not considered to be 
a ‘major problem’ and so other matters were taking priority.13 
   In this article I will analyse the judgment of HHJ Murphy in R v D and, (whilst recognising 
that it was a carefully considered, sensitively reasoned and meticulously researched summary 
of the jurisprudence of the courts), consider whether the judge attached too much weight to the 
notion that a trier of fact needs to assess the demeanour of a witness in order to gauge 
credibility. I shall review whether the judgment breached the defendant’s right under article 9 
of the ECHR as well as her right to a fair trial under article 6. I will suggest that the matter 
                                                          
10 R v D [2014] 1 LRC 629. 
11 See for example the commentary in Richardson (2015) Archbold at para 4-167a p427. 
12 Thomas LCJ, Transcript of the Lord Chief Justice’s annual press conference 5th November 2013 
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/.../lcj-press-conference-2013.pdf> accessed 27th February 2015. 
13 Thomas LCJ, Press Conference held by The Lord Chief Justice Of England And Wales 
on Tuesday 05 November 2013 (Judiciarygovuk, 17 November 2015) <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/lcj-press-conference-2015.pdf> accessed 14 January 2016. 
could have been resolved by an alternative approach, namely through a judicial direction in 
summing up. 
   I do not, in this article, intend to discuss at length the questions of whether or not the 
observance of Niqaab is a manifestation of religion for the purposes of article 9 ECHR or 
whether Islamic law permits the removal of it by a woman who is required to give evidence. 
Neither of these positions are settled, but HHJ Murphy reached his decision on the basis that 
by wishing to remain veiled for the purposes of proceedings the defendant genuinely believed 
she was manifesting her religion.14 The Qu’ran itself does not require the wearing of the 
Niqaab, (requiring only modesty in dress)15 and for many of the faith it is considered 
unnecessary.16 Even amongst those who do believe it to be a religious requirement, guidance 
suggests that it may be removed in the presence of a judge.17 However there are some adherents 
whose faith is such that they believe that their face may not be uncovered in the presence of 
males outside of their immediate family in any circumstances, including whilst testifying in a 
court of law. The House of Lords in Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
and others (Respondents) ex parte Williamson (Appellant) and others18 clearly warned courts 
against embarking on an investigation on anything more than the question of whether an 
individual genuinely held that belief with Lord Nicholls stating; 
 [I]t is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its 
'validity' by some objective standard such as the source material upon which the claimant 
founds his belief or the orthodox teaching of the religion in question or the extent to 
                                                          
14 R v D (n 10) [20]. 
15 The Qu’ran 24:30-31 
16 Islamqainfo, '' (Islamqainfo, ) <http://islamqa.info/en/21134> accessed 25 September 2015 
17 Islamqainfo, '' (Islamqainfo, ) <http://islamqa.info/en/21134> accessed 25 September 2015 (referred to in R v 
D) 
18 Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others (Respondents) ex parte Williamson 
(Appellant) and others [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246. 
which the claimant's belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the 
same religion.19 
There is no evidence to suggest that the defendant in R v D did not genuinely hold the belief  
she claimed and therefore the extent to which it may, or may not, represent orthodox religious 
teaching is irrelevant to this discussion. 
 Despite having referred to the ‘Niqaab’ thus far I shall hereinafter refer to the ‘veil’ (save 
where quoting from elsewhere, where in doing so I shall retain whichever variant of the spelling 
is used in the original text). I adopt this practice for the reasons cited by Bakht, namely that 
this generic approach has ‘pervaded the literature and it is thus difficult to extract specific 
objections.’20 Within this definition I include any form of covering of the facial features but I 
do not include the hijab which traditionally only covers the hair and chest  
The approach of the courts in England and Wales prior to R v D 
Until R v D, very little attempt had been made to definitively resolve the legal issues relating 
to the wearing of the veil in court and the approach which the courts took was determined by 
the nature of the hearing, the issue which was raised and the facts of the case.  
   In R v M, (7 November 2001, Nottingham magistrates’ court),21District Judge Peter Nuttall 
refused an application made by the defence that a prosecution witness be compelled to remove 
her veil prior to testifying. He directed a course, by which she was invited, in open court, to 
remove the veil but was told that the choice was hers to make. He indicated that in assessing 
the prosecution evidence he would be deprived of the opportunity of relying on her demeanour 
and that he would make no assumptions which were favourable to the prosecution in this 
                                                          
19 Ibid. [22]. 
20 Natasha Bakht, Objection Your Honour! Accommodating Niqaab wearing women in Courtrooms on R. Grillo 
et al eds., Law, Practice and Cultural Diversity. (Ashgate publishing 2009) pp 115 -133. 
21 Unreported. Prosecuted by the author of this paper. 
respect. The trial proceeded on this basis with the victim being permitted to retain the veil. The 
approach taken by the district judge appeared to strike a balance between protecting the right 
of the defendant to a fair trial and the complainant. It is of course important to note that as a 
district judge (magistrates’ court) he acted as both tribunal of fact and of law. As such in 
determining the potential impact of the veil, he was able to take into account his own 
assessment of how the veil would interfere (or otherwise) with his own ability to assess the 
facts; a position which differs from that of a circuit judge who has to speculate on the approach 
a jury might take. Implicit within the judge’s decision is the idea that cues from demeanour had 
the potential to assist as a corroborative factor in deciding whether the prosecution had 
discharged their evidential burden, but that it was not central to the decision making process. 
   In SL v MJ,22 a case from the Family Division of the High Court, Mrs Justice Macur, hearing 
a petition for nullity of a marriage, permitted the case to be heard so that the petitioner was 
allowed to give evidence without her veil, but in such a way that no male could see her. It was 
possible to make such an order as the only male present in court was the petitioner’s own 
counsel who consented to a barrier being placed between himself and the petitioner during such 
time as her veil was removed. Macur J observed; 
The ability to observe a witness' demeanour and deportment during the giving of 
evidence is important and, in my view, essential to assess accuracy and credibility. It is 
a matter of extreme importance that witnesses in such sensitive cases as this should be 
permitted to present their case to the satisfaction of the court but also observing their 
religious observance of dress. In my view, the facility of screens and the ability, if at all 
possible, to list these cases before a female judge, would obviate the objections of 
                                                          
22 [2006] EWHC 3743 (Fam). 
litigants or witnesses subject to an assessment of the genuine nature of their 
unwillingness to appear before the court without the veil.23 
   It is, perhaps, of significance that the allegation made by the petitioner (and accepted by 
Macur J as being the truth) was that she had been the victim of a forced marriage and was now 
in genuine fear of honour based violence as result of her actions in seeking to divorce the 
respondent. There is a clearly expressed public policy24 which seeks to ensure that victims of 
forced marriage can seek assistance from the courts. There is no evidence available as to 
whether Macur J’s suggestion of routine listing of such cases before a female judge has been 
adopted. It is an approach which resolved the difficulty presented to the judge in a manner 
which did not compromise the petitioner’s faith whilst still allowing the judge to assess her 
demeanour. The petitioner bore the persuasive burden of satisfying the judge that the marriage 
should be annulled, and therefore credibility was an issue in the case although in the absence 
of any challenge to her evidence the extent to which demeanour needed to be assessed was, 
negligible. Although, superficially, this approach appears to have reconciled the conflicting 
interests of the parties, it is questionable whether the proposals for case managing such cases 
in the future were sustainable, especially those where the evidence was contested by the 
respondent. The idea that a particular type of case can only be heard by a female judge is an 
unusual one which may of itself be perceived by critics to be a modification of the court 
administration process for the benefit of a small number of individuals. 
 In November 2006, Immigration Adjudicator George Glossop ordered the adjournment case 
in which the legal adviser was wearing a veil on the grounds that it rendered her inaudible, 
requesting that a different representative attend in her place.25 The matter was referred to the 
                                                          
23 Ibid.. 
24 Recognised for example in Home Affairs Committee, Domestic violence, forced marriage and “honour-
based” based violence, 20 May 2008, HC 263 of 2007-08 . 
25 BBC News ‘Muslim women “can wear veils in court.”’ BBC News'' (London, 10 November 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6134804.stm> accessed 25 September. 
chair of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Hodge J) who overturned the decision and 
issued interim guidance directing immigration judges only to request the removal of the veil if 
it was necessary in the interests of justice. 
   As a result of this case the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, referred the issue to the Judicial 
Studies Board Equal Treatment Advisory Committee.26Guidance was issued in 2007 and was 
adopted within the “Equal Opportunities Bench Book”27 at Rule 3.3. The guidance stated inter 
alia; 
It is important to acknowledge from the outset that for Muslim women who do choose to 
wear the niqab, it is an important element of their religious and cultural identity. To force 
a choice between that identity (or cultural acceptability), and the woman’s involvement 
in the criminal, civil justice, or tribunal system (as a witness, party, member of court staff 
or legal office-holder) may well have a significant impact on that woman’s sense of 
dignity and would likely serve to exclude and marginalise further women with limited 
visibility in courts and tribunals.” 
As a witness or defendant 
For a witness or defendant, similarly, a sensitive request to remove a veil, with no sense 
of obligation or pressure, may be appropriate, but careful thought must be given to such 
a request. 
The very fact of appearing in a court or tribunal will be quite traumatic for many, and 
additional pressure may well have an adverse impact on the quality of evidence given. 
Any request to remove a veil should be accompanied by an explanation by the judge of 
their concern that, where there are crucial issues of credit, the woman might be at a 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27Judicial Studies Board, 2007. Equal Treatment Bench Book, 2007 (Judicial Studies Board 2007). 
disadvantage if the judge or jury is not able to assess her demeanour or facial expressions 
when responding to questions. The witness or party may wish to discuss the matter with 
her legal representative or witness support worker. It is worth emphasising that while it 
may be more difficult in some cases to assess the evidence of a woman wearing a niqab, 
the experiences of judges in other cases have shown that it is often possible to do so, 
depending on all the circumstances– hence the need to give careful thought to whether 
the veil presents a true obstacle to the judicial task. Can it be said of the particular case, 
that the assessment will be different where the judge is able to see the witness’s face? In 
a criminal case, the position should be explained in the absence of the jury and the 
possibility considered of offering the use of permitted special measures, for example a 
television link. Where identification is an issue, then it must be dealt with appropriately, 
and may require the witness to make a choice between giving evidence in the case while 
showing her face, and not being able to be a witness.     
R v D 
The defendant in R v D was charged with witness intimidation and sent to the Blackfriars 
Crown Court. Her case was listed before HHJ Murphy for a Plea and Case Management hearing 
on 22 August 2013. She answered her bail dressed in a veil which covered the entirety of her 
face apart from her eyes. The judge requested that she remove her veil, she declined asserting 
that her faith required that she should not reveal her face in the presence of men. The judge 
adjourned the matter to 12 September 2013 for both parties to file skeleton arguments on the 
issue. The judge heard argument and deferred judgment, to the 16 September 2013 when he 
gave directions for the remainder of proceedings.28 
                                                          
28 R v D (n 10) [1]. 
   At the outset of his ruling Judge Murphy made clear that his judgment dealt solely with the 
position of a defendant and not that of an advocate, witness or juror, and also only directed 
towards cases being tried by a jury.29 He acknowledged the guidance offered by the Bench 
Book but disagreed with the view expressed that it was matter of “judicial discretion” and 
proceeded on the basis it was matter of law which needed to be approached with clarity and 
consistency.30 He acknowledged the sensitivity of the task he faced and the importance of 
proper guidance being issued at a higher level.31 
   Having decided therefore that any ruling would proceed on the basis that the defendant was 
sincerely manifesting her religion, the judge proceeded to review the legal principles and 
directed himself that there were three principles underlying the practice of the Crown Court; 
the rule of law, open justice and the adversarial trial.32 In respect of the latter he added that; ‘It 
is essential to the proper working of an adversarial trial that all involved with the trial – judge, 
jury, witnesses, and defendant – be able to see and identify each other at all times during the 
proceedings.’ 
   His rationale for this was primarily due to the need for the jury to be able to assess the 
credibility of a witness through their demeanour. He noted that this was a principle 
acknowledged by both the common law and the European Court of Human Rights (a point I 
shall discuss later). He catalogued the circumstances in which this principle could be derogated 
from but noted that these were specific statutory exceptions.33 
   Having reviewed the principles which governed criminal proceedings, the judge moved onto 
an analysis of the European jurisprudence in relation to article 9. He observed that the right to 
                                                          
29 R v D (n 10) [7]–[8]. 
30 R v D (n 10) [11]. 
31 R v D (n 10) [12]. 
32 R v D (n 10) [27]. 
33 R v D (n 10) [33] 
manifest religion or belief by virtue of article 9(2) was a qualified right which could be balanced 
against the public interest in public safety, public order, health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others: as long as any limitation is prescribed by law, necessary in 
a democratic society, and proportionate. In applying this to the case before him he ruled that; 
‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of others include, in my judgment, the rights of 
persons who come before the court as complainants, witnesses and jurors.’34 
   The judge then conducted a wider review of the approach taken by the domestic courts to 
alleged infringements of article 9 and identified the wide margin of appreciation which the 
European Court had granted in this respect.35  
   The judge moved to an analysis of the case before him. He acknowledged that a ‘rule 
prohibiting the wearing of the Niqaab in court would cause the defendant some degree of 
discomfort…The court may however be able to mitigate that in some ways’ but also stated that 
he also needed to consider the rights and freedoms of others whose participation was essential. 
At paragraph 59 he expressed this is stark terms; 
It is unfair to ask a juror to pass judgment on a person he cannot see. It is unfair to expect 
that juror to try and evaluate the evidence given by a person whom she cannot see, 
deprived of an essential tool for doing so: namely being able to see the demeanour of the 
witness; her reaction to being questioned; her reaction to other evidence as it is given. 
These are not trivial or superficial invasions of the procedure of the adversarial trial. At 
best they require a compromise of the quality of criminal justice delivered by the trial 
process. At worst they go to its very essence, and they may render it impotent to deliver 
a fair and just outcome.36 
                                                          
34 R v D (n 10) [30]. 
35 R v D (n 10) [31]–[41]. 
36 R v D (n 10) [59]. 
  Having recognised the importance of article 9, the judge concluded that it was not necessary 
for the defendant to remove her veil for the majority of the trial, as he was not satisfied that the 
need of the jury to be able to assess her demeanour during this time was of such importance 
that it required the article 9 right to be limited. He determined however that he would refuse to 
permit her to give evidence in her own defence unless she removed her veil prior to doing so.37 
   Having decided that he was placing a limitation upon an article 9 right, HHJ Murphy then 
scrutinised that limitation against the criteria which permits the qualification of rights protected 
by the ECHR. He concluded there was a basis in law derived from the inherent power of a trial 
judge to regulate proceedings to ensure that proceedings are fair.38He found there to be a 
legitimate aim in maintaining the fair and effective operation of the criminal courts39 and that 
there was a necessity in limiting the right to ensure the ‘rights and freedoms of the public, the 
press, and other interested parties such as the complainant in the proper administration of 
justice.’40 In turning to the question of proportionality he addressed whether there was a less 
restrictive approach which enabled the court to resolve the conflict.41 He suggested that 
although a defendant would be free to wear a veil throughout a trial she should be advised by 
the judge of the potentially prejudicial consequences of doing so. At the point where she came 
to testify she would be told to remove the veil and, if she refused, she would not be permitted 
to give evidence. If this situation arose the jury would be directed in summing up in accordance 
with the Bench Book, namely that they would be permitted (if certain preconditions were met) 
to draw inferences from her failure to testify. If a defendant did give evidence without the veil 
measures would be put in place to shield her face from the gaze of the public gallery so that 
                                                          
37 R v D (n 10) [74]. 
38 R v D (n 10) [76]. 
39 R v D (n 10) [77]. 
40 R v D (n 10) [77]. 
41 R v D (n 10) [79]. 
her face was only seen by the judge, advocates and jury.42He gave case management directions 
in these terms and the case was adjourned for trial. 
   By way of post script, the defendant subsequently stood trial. She did not testify. The jury 
were unable to reach a decision in respect of her or her co-defendant but prior to a re-trial a 
guilty plea was tendered. 
 The ruling in R v D attempts to resolve a lacuna in the law in manner which balances the rights 
of all parties. It has potentially far reaching consequences.  Although the judge, at the outset of 
the ruling stated that he only intended to deal with the position of defendants, it is clear that his 
reasoning flows from the potential effect of the veil upon the jury’s assessment of the evidence. 
It must, therefore, be the case that this reasoning applies equally to all witnesses called by either 
party. Judges routinely direct juries that they must consider the evidence of the defendant in 
the same fair way they consider the evidence of all other witnesses and if the problem is a 
purely an evidential one, there can be no justification to limit its application to just the 
defendant. It is perfectly foreseeable that a jury could be asked to try a case in which both the 
prosecution witness and defendant wished to wear a veil and a rule which differentiated 
between them simply by virtue of the party on whose behalf they testify is likely to offend the 
principle of ‘justice not only being done, but being seen to be done.’43 
A perspective from other jurisdictions 
The courts in England and Wales are not alone in having to consider the wearing of the veil in 
court, although it appears that only one common law jurisdiction (Canada) has promulgated a 
binding superior court authority on the point. The absence of appellate court decisions is 
perhaps due to the difficulty in establishing a nexus between the removal of the veil and the 
                                                          
42 R v D (n 10) [83]. 
43 R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256. 
defects in the ultimate decision under review. The fact that there is little case law on the point 
so does not, however, make the issue unimportant. The courts are the fora in which the rights 
of an individual are defined and a democracy which upholds the rule of law must ensure that 
all parties are equal before the courts. The issue of the treatment of an individual before the 
courts in which their cause is litigated can be divorced from the decision ultimately reached in 
that matter. A legal system which requires, without just cause, an individual to compromise 
their rights in order to obtain justice from the courts is not one which can be said to fully uphold 
the rule of law.  
   In NS v The Queen44 the appellant was the main prosecution witness in the trial of two family 
members (M---d S and M---l S) who were accused of sexually assaulting her. She was called 
to testify at a preliminary hearing and a defence application was made that she remove her veil. 
The judge at first instance made a finding of fact that she did not sincerely hold that belief and 
ordered the removal of her veil. She appealed to the Superior Court of Justice where Marocco 
J quashed the order,45 holding that N.S. should have been allowed to testify wearing a veil if 
she asserted a sincere religious belief for doing so, but that the trial judge had the option to 
exclude her evidence if it impeded cross examination. N.S. appealed to the Court of Appeal 
and M---d S. cross appealed.46 The Court of Appeal adopted an approach which permitted the 
wearing of the veil unless the rights of the defendant to fair trial could not be reconciled with 
this right. The Court of Appeal cited a number of factors to be taken into account including the 
nature of the trial, the nature of the evidence and societal interests. N.S. appealed. The appeal 
was dismissed (Abella J dissenting) and the matter remitted to the lower courts. 
                                                          
44NS v The Queen [2012] 3 SCR 726. 
45Ibid. [19]. 
46Ibid. [5]. 
   In giving the judgment of the majority, Maclachlan CJ accepted that N.S. had a right to wear 
the veil under clause 2 (a) of the Canadian Charters of Rights and Freedoms and that assertion 
of that right was based upon ‘sincerity’ or belief rather than strength.47 She further 
acknowledged that requiring her to remove that veil would interfere with that freedom. She 
also examined the defendant’s right to a fair trial and concluded; 
The common law, supported by the provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-
46, and judicial pronouncements, proceeds on the basis that the ability to see a witness’s 
face is an important part of a fair trial. While not conclusive, in the absence of negating 
evidence this common law assumption cannot be disregarded lightly.48 
   Having identified this conflict the court sought to identify means of accommodate both rights. 
Although not reaching a conclusion on this matter and directing that it was a matter for the 
judge at first instance to determine, the court stated that it would be possible to proceed without 
an order requiring the removal of the veil.49 
   In the final stage of the analysis, Maclachlan CJ moved to consider whether the deleterious 
effects of requiring the witness to remove the veil outweighed the salutary effects. Whilst once 
again deferring decision of this matter to the judge at first instance she ventured that ‘where 
the liberty of the accused is at stake, the witness’s evidence is central to the case and her 
credibility vital, the possibility of a wrongful conviction must weigh heavily in the balance, 
favouring the removal of the niqab.’50 
   In her dissenting judgment, Abella J, agreed with the approach to be taken but disagreed with 
the conclusion that the balancing test in the final stage favoured the removal of the veil. She 
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48 Ibid. [21]. 
49 Ibid. [33]. 
50 Ibid. [44]. 
queried the value of demeanour as a tool for assessing credibility before highlighting the risks 
that vulnerable witnesses would be deterred from testifying if they were compelled to remove 
their veil. She concluded that ‘not being able to see a witness’ whole face is only part of an 
imprecise measuring tool of credibility, we are left to wonder why we demand full “demeanour 
access” where religious belief prevents it.’51 
   Other common law jurisdictions have approached matters in a similar way. In New Zealand 
a prosecution witness was required, upon a defence application, to remove her veil due to the 
risk of the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the New Zealand Bill of Rights being 
compromised.52 In Australia, in the case of R v Anwar Sayed, a similar ruling was made by the 
trial judge, HHJ Deane53 who appeared to reject the notion (advanced by the prosecution) that 
the fact the witness was testifying on a peripheral matter was a relevant factor in her decision, 
thus appearing to adopt an approach that mandated the removal of the veil in every case. 
   Judicial consideration of the issue of the veil has not only been restricted to criminal cases. 
In the USA the issue arose in a contractual dispute heard in the Hamtrack small claims court, 
Michigan.54 At the outset of the hearing, Judge Paul Parul invited the claimant in the action to 
remove her veil as he believed it to be a ‘custom thing’ and not a religious observation. On the 
claimant’s refusal he dismissed the claim without prejudice as he could not determine the 
veracity of her testimony.55Following this ruling the Michigan Supreme Court invited the 
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public to comment, and as a result amended Rule 611 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence to 
read as follows; 
Appearance of Parties and Witnesses. The court shall exercise reasonable control over 
the appearance of parties and witnesses so as to (1) ensure that the demeanor of such 
persons may be observed and assessed by the fact-finder and (2) ensure the accurate 
identification of such persons.56 
   Muhammed brought a claim against the judge for violation of her rights but ultimately 
withdrew her claim before oral argument.57 The decision at first instance has been widely 
criticized with Schwartzbaum observing that ‘for a religious Muslim woman like Muhammad, 
the ban on the niqab in Michigan courtrooms is the functional equivalent of a courthouse 
without a ramp or an elevator for a paraplegic.’58 
  It does appear however that the approach taken by the judge has, following public comment, 
received the retrospective approval of the Michigan Supreme Court and created a legislative 
rule that seeks to preserve the special status of demeanour.  
   At the heart of all the case law, both in England and Wales and internationally, is the notion  
that ‘demeanour’ is central to the fact finding process and that without being able to assess the 
non-verbal communication of a witness a fact finder will be hindered in his or her job. But does 
‘demeanour’ deserve such prominence as a judicial decision making tool? 
Assessing credibility from demeanour 
   At the heart of the adversarial trial is the notion that one or more questions of fact will need 
to be resolved. Where the parties present differing versions of the facts, a judge or jury will 
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have to assess the credibility of the witnesses called by each party and, in doing so, will look 
at the entirety of their evidence.  A florid expression of the perceived importance of demeanour 
can be seen in Police v Razmajoo where the judge at first instance stated; 
…[T]here are types of situation…in which the demeanour of a witness undergoes quite 
a dramatic change in the course of his evidence. The look which says “I hoped not to be 
asked that question” sometimes even a look of downright hatred at counsel by a witness 
who obviously senses he is being trapped can be expressive. 59 
   As both HHJ Murphy in R v D, and the Chief Justice in NS v The Queen commented, the 
Court of Appeal frequently observes that the court at first instance had the ‘opportunity to see 
and hear the witnesses.’ An example of such comment can be seen in Onassis v Vergottis,60 
where Lord Pearce stated; 
A Court of Appeal should never interfere unless that both the judgment ought not to stand 
and that the divergence of view between the trial judge and the Court of Appeal has not 
been occasioned by any demeanour of the witnesses or truer atmosphere of the trial 
(which may have eluded an appellate Court) or by any of those other advantages a trial 
judge possesses. 
   It is doubtful however whether these pronouncements are serving any greater purpose than 
reminding appellate courts (and those who seek to argue before them) of the wider principle 
that the purpose of an appeal is to consider the legality of decisions, and not the findings of fact 
which underpin them. 
  The prevalence of comments appearing to uphold the importance of demeanour is not, 
however, indicative of a consensus on this point. A number of experienced trial judges and 
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jurists have expressed contrary views on the subject. Lord Devlin doubted his own abilities in 
this field stating that; 
The great virtue…is usually said to be the opportunity it (the trial) gives to the judge to 
tell from the demeanour of the witness whether he or she is telling the truth. I think that 
this is overrated…it is the tableau which constitutes the big advantage, the text with the 
illustrations rather than the demeanour of a particular witness.61 
   These concerns have also been expressed in Australia where Sir Richard Eggleston QC 
identified the nature of the problem thus; 
Many judges think they can tell from the demeanour of the witness when he is lying, but 
in the course of my practice at the Bar there were several occasions on which witnesses 
who I firmly believed to be honest and to be telling the truth, displayed evident signs of 
embarrassment and discomfort in the witness box, sufficient to make them appear to be 
lying.62 
   Reflecting on these views Lord Bingham, writing in 1985, leant his support to those who 
‘question the value of demeanour - even of inflexion, or the turn of an eyelid, as a guide.’ He 
crystallised the problem as being that ‘to rely on demeanour is in most cases to attach deviations 
from a norm when the truth is there is no norm.’63 
   Although these observations were framed in the context of single judges sitting as triers of 
fact in civil cases, they must also be applicable to lay juries sitting in criminal cases, in part 
because of the relative lack of experience of a juror in assessing credibility in a trial setting but 
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also because of the greater need for accuracy in their decision making as they determine the 
liability of an individual to criminal sanction. 
  Scientific research has given credence to those who doubt the ability of lay persons to 
accurately use demeanour to assess credibility. Ekman and O Sullivan conducted an experiment 
in which 509 individuals including law enforcement officers (including police officers, 
members of the secret service and FBI), judges, psychiatrists, college students and working 
adults were shown a videotape showing 10 people describing their feelings. Participants were 
asked to decide whether each speaker was telling the truth or lying. The results showed that 
those employed by the secret service demonstrated the highest degree of accuracy in identifying 
liars (100% were correct more than 40% of the time and 53% more than 60%), the remainder 
of the group produced results which were consistent with those which would be expected if the 
decisions were being made on the basis of pure guesswork (for example of the 110 trial judges 
sampled, 93% were correct more than 40% of the time and 34% more than 70% of the time;7% 
were wrong more than 60% of the time). 64 
   This is not say that it is not possible to detect deceit via analysis of verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour. A study conducted by Portsmouth University in which nursing students were asked 
to tell the truth or lie about a video they had watched, indicated that there were some 
behavioural traits which were more evident in the group who were lying than in those who 
were telling the truth. In the context of the veil, it is noteworthy that those behaviours where 
the difference was most pronounced, were those which would not be masked by the wearing 
of a veil (for example speech pattern and hand movement).  The study noted however that its 
participants were being asked to create a completely false account in a short period of time and 
accepted this may be different to the situation where a witness was giving a partially true 
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account and therefore were dealing with a lower ‘cognitive load.’65This study supported 
previous research which concluded that untrained observers hold false beliefs about those 
behaviours which may be clues to deceit. Vrij and Semin found that 75% of professional 
investigators believed gaze aversion to be a reliable indicia of deceit whereas their research 
suggested there is no proven correlation between the two. 66  The inescapable conclusion from 
research in this area is that accurate lie detection through demeanour is possible, but that it can 
only be undertaken reliably by trained observers in controlled conditions and not via the  
determination of a randomly selected jury.  
   The idea that liars betray themselves through their demeanour is predicated on the assumption 
that there is a single set of behaviours which are detectable and of universal application but in 
the words of Vrij,’no theory predicts the existence of cues uniquely related to deception, like 
Pinocchio’s growing nose and, indeed, no such cue has been found to date.’ 67 
   Although there is some evidence to suggest that the cognitive burden involved in the telling 
of lies produces cues which might be detectable, other emotions may also produce similar cues. 
Keltner and Harker68 identify a set of behavioural traits including gaze aversion and posture 
constriction which are consistent with shame. This shame derives not only from a realisation 
that one has transgressed against a law, but also from a perception that one has failed to meet 
a personal moral standard. 
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  The reasons that a woman would chose to wear a veil are complex but are summarised by 
Brems as ‘a desire to reach a higher level of piety.’ 69The requirement that a witness be required 
to remove her veil in the presence of men compels an individual to compromise their own 
moral and religious codes. Doing so is apt to increase that feeling of shame and produce those 
cues which are prone to be misinterpreted as signs of guilt. Indeed it is perhaps important to 
remember that the first act that a religious adherent will be asked to undertake on removing her 
veil is to swear an oath upon her holy book.70 Although the act of swearing an oath can be said 
to have ‘rationalized from a declaration that a witness is answerable to their deity to a formal 
procedure with legally defined elements’71 there remains a requirement that the oath is binding 
on the conscience of a witness.72 A witness who is required to compromise their piety in one 
respect, whilst affirming it another is arguably more likely to experience those feelings of 
shame with a greater risk of this manifesting itself in non-verbal behaviour. Indeed in R v D it 
appears to have been explicitly submitted on D’s behalf that she would experience ‘upset’ and 
attempt to mask it by placing her hands to her face.73 
   Other factors relevant to a witness in court may produce traits which could be mistaken for 
evidence of deceit. De Paulo et al74 identify  other factors which may produce behaviours which 
may be mistaken for deceit including a desire for a truthful story to be believed and a 
nervousness at speaking in public. The risk of these behaviours being present and 
misinterpreted is, of course, present when any witness gives evidence and in the normal course 
of a trial no specific attention would be drawn to them (indeed the summing up of the evidence 
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concentrates on the words spoken and not their delivery). However by requiring an individual 
to remove their veil purely for the purposes of giving her evidence there is the risk that the jury 
is subliminally directed that there is weight to be attached to their assessment of demeanour 
and this in turn risks a greater importance being attached to it than is justified. This, coupled 
with the fact that there is a greater risk of the wearer manifesting their shame or embarrassment 
in a manner which might be interpreted as guilt, increases the danger that the credibility of a 
witness may be determined erroneously by the finder of fact due to an overreliance on an 
attempted assessment of demeanour. 
  It seems that these findings and the work of others who have built upon it were not fully before 
HHJ Murphy who mentioned them briefly; 
Both Ms Meek and Professor Edwards argue that the value of seeing a witness in the 
process of evaluating her evidence can be overstated…I recognise that there is a school 
of thought to that effect, and I do not mean to suggest that other factors, including the 
substance of the evidence are not of great importance.75 
   In NS v The Queen, although reference was made to research in this area it was not tendered 
in expert evidence76 and therefore the Supreme Court was not prepared to depart from 
established practice, although the Chief Justice commented that ‘future cases will doubtless 
raise other factors, and scientific exploration of the importance of seeing a witness’s face to 
cross examination and credibility may enhance or diminish the force of the arguments made in 
this case.’77 
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   This hints at a future receptiveness by the Canadian judiciary to revisiting this position and 
determining these arguments on the basis of scientific principle rather than the engrained belief 
of the judiciary. 
Was the ruling a breach of article 9? 
  There is no doubt that requiring the removal of the veil worn for religious reasons engages 
article 9 of the ECHR. What determines the lawfulness, or otherwise, of the decision is whether 
the requirement is a ‘limitation’ permitted by the legislation or a ‘breach’ which is not. It is 
therefore necessary to consider (as HHJ Murphy did) the criteria which must be met under 
article 9(2) before a limitation will be permitted. 
Article 9 (2) states that; 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
Is the limitation ‘prescribed by law’? 
The test for analysing whether an act was prescribed by law was set out by the European Court 
of Human Rights in The Sunday Times v The UK;78 
In the Court’s opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow from the 
expression ‘prescribed by law’. Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen 
must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules 
applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must 
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be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those 
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. 
   The European Court of Human Rights accepted that there was no requirement for the law to 
be based in statute and that it could be the product of judicial precedent. 
   In applying this part of the test, HHJ Murphy acknowledged that certain materials in the 
public domain (in particular the Bench Book) “might lead a reader to suppose that there is a 
limited right to wear the veil” but stated that these materials did not have the force of law. He 
stated that in his view; 
a reader who considers all relevant material in the public domain about the practice would 
be clear about the essential elements of a criminal trial…moreover that reader would also 
be aware that a trial judge has an inherent power to regulate the conduct of proceedings 
to ensure that no abuse of the Court occurs, and to ensure that the proceedings are fair to 
all parties…It is a matter on which a person could receive accurate advice from a 
competent solicitor.79 
    The cautionary approach the Equal Treatment Bench Book advises in respect of the veil 
attempts to identify and reconcile disparate strands of principle and draw them together so that 
individuals are treated in a consistent manner. In the absence of legislative guidance the 
experienced solicitor may well turn to the Bench Book for guidance and whilst it urges care 
and sensitivity it clearly anticipates situations when removal of a veil will be appropriate. It is 
likely that this would suffice for the purposes of assessing whether the limitation was 
‘prescribed by law’ and regardless of the position prior to R v D, the incorporation of that 
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judgment into legal literature makes it inevitable that any future arguments on that point would 
be certain to fail. 
Is the limitation “in pursuit of a legitimate aim”? 
In order to fulfil this second limb of the test the purpose of the limitation must be to advance 
one of the legitimate aims identified within the text of the convention. HHJ Murphy expressed 
this objective as; 
The fair and effective operation of the criminal courts which act in the interests of victims 
of crime and the public generally, is…an important vehicle for the prevention of disorder 
and crime, and an important vehicle for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
persons including the victims of crime and the public at large.80 
It is right to say that the operation of the courts unarguably fits within the legitimate aims 
expressed in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights of ‘protection of public 
order and protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ The question that requires greater 
analysis is ‘does allowing the retention of the veil prevent the fair operation of the courts?’ If 
it does not then the limitation cannot be said to be ‘necessary.’ 
Was the limitation ‘necessary’? 
   The definition of “necessary” (adopted by HHJ Murphy) is taken from Sunday Times v UK81 
where it was stated that “whilst the adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 (2), 
is not synonymous with “indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 
“admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable” and that it implies the existence 
of a “pressing social need."’ 
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   The judge concluded that the ‘adverse effect produced on the adversarial trial’ of not asking 
the defendant to remove her veil necessitated the order he was making. However as discussed 
previously, the evidence that such an “adverse effect” exists is not compelling. In R v Shayler, 
Lord Hope stated that there was a burden upon an authority seeking to justify a restriction to 
impose to show that the means imposed were no greater than necessary. 82 No evidence was 
presented which demonstrated an actual, rather than perceived, adverse effect upon the trial in 
R v D and indeed the research cited above would suggest that evidence, if presented would not 
support the judge’s conclusion. 
 Wherever possible the criminal litigation system does try and ensure that a witness’s evidence 
is given in view of the fact finder and this finds recognition in legislation. For example the 
legislation which allows the use of screens for vulnerable witnesses makes express provision 
for the witness to see and be seen by the judge, jury and advocates83 and similar provisions 
exist in the witness anonymity provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.84 The judgment 
in R v D proceeds on the basis that there is a ‘pressing social need’ for fact finders to see the 
demeanour of the witness, however examples can be found within the criminal justice system 
of departures from this principle.   
   The adversarial system does not preclude those who are unable to see the demeanour of a 
witness due to visual impairment from acting as triers of fact. There is no prohibition on those 
who are blind or partially sighted sitting as jurors or magistrates. There is at least one blind 
circuit judge trying criminal cases85 and at least one blind deputy district judge trying civil 
cases in the county court.86 There is no suggestion that they are unable to discharge their duties 
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properly. In the case of the juror or the magistrate trying a criminal case they are part of a larger 
group which requires the vote of a majority to make a decision. But there would seem to be no 
reason why a person who is blind could not be appointed to try criminal cases alone as a district 
judge in the magistrates ‘court. It could be argued that a judge sitting alone is unlikely to try a 
criminal case at the Crown Court, however it is perfectly possible that a judge could be asked 
to make a significant finding of fact based on the credibility of a witness in determining whether 
to admit or exclude a crucial piece of prosecution evidence in a voir dire or stay proceedings 
as an abuse of process. A district judge in the civil courts may, in the exercise of his or her 
powers to commit for contempt, impose a sentence of imprisonment having resolved a question 
of conflicting evidence.  If such a finding of fact were to be made by a person who is blind it 
would seem that the principle that an appeal court should not interfere with the fact finder’s 
assessment of the evidence would prevent these decisions being re-evaluated on appeal.  
   The discussions surrounding the issue of demeanour have often taken place in a context 
which assumes that the covering of the face is a ‘choice’ which can be overruled by the courts. 
If, however, demeanour is of such centrality to the trial process, this means that, by extension 
in cases where the witness has no ‘choice’ over the covering of his or her face, then the court 
system would be compelled to accommodate this above all other considerations. The following 
hypothetical, but not impossible, scenario illustrates the difficulty with that approach. 
   A defendant is charged with a serious offence against a child victim. The case is listed for 
trial. Six weeks prior to the trial, the defendant is involved in a road traffic accident causing 
him serious facial injuries. He is required to wear bandages over his face, but is otherwise 
deemed fit to attend the trial. Counsel for the defence makes an application for the trial to be 
adjourned so that his demeanour can be properly assessed by the jury at trial. This will result 
in the trial being delayed by several months. It is almost certainly the case, that in these 
circumstances, the judge hearing the application would conclude that the interests of justice 
require that, if the defendant is fit to attend trial, then the trial process could accommodate the 
inability to assess the facial expressions of the defendant and conclude that the interests of the 
victim in having the case heard at the earliest opportunity prevail. If the reasoning in R v D is 
correct however, the judge would have no such discretion, as the importance of assessing 
demeanour must take precedence and the case would have to be adjourned until such time as it 
could properly be displayed. This would be placing too great a restriction on the discretion of 
the courts for too little a benefit. 
   There is also statutory basis upon which evidence can be admitted and assessed without 
observing the demeanour of the witness. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allow 
for the admission of hearsay evidence to be given when a witness is unable to attend court and 
be cross examined. Such evidence is usually presented via a statement being read by the 
advocate to the court. In these circumstances the trier of fact has no opportunity to observe the 
witness. Hearsay evidence is admissible in a wide variety of circumstances including the broad 
‘interests of justice’ test.87 These provisions have been held to be consistent with a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial under article 6, as long as sufficient safeguards are in place and a cautionary 
direction is given to the jury.88 The statutory regime and subsequent procedural safeguards 
assume that specific situations may place the need of party to admit evidence in pursuance of 
a fair trial above the need to assess the demeanour of the maker of the statement. Statute has, 
by retaining an interests of justice test, not sought to circumscribe the circumstances in which 
this might arise, an approach which recognises the inherent unpredictability of the criminal 
justice system and the need for flexibility of approach. 
   It would therefore seem that the best that can be said of the need to ensure the finder of fact 
can see the demeanour of the witness is that the law recognises is it as ‘preferable’ or ‘highly 
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desirable’ but not ‘necessary.’ The justice system although seeking to achieve best practice can 
demonstrate the flexibility to accommodate fact finding without observing the demeanour of a 
witness. In the case of the blind fact finder the public policy in maintaining a diverse judiciary 
takes precedence, in the case of hearsay evidence, the public policy which takes priority is that 
parties should not be hampered in the presentation of their case by factors outside their control. 
There is an equally compelling public policy argument that women who wear the veil should 
have confidence that they can seek justice before the courts without having to compromise their 
religious beliefs and the criminal court system should be able to deliver a fair trial to all parties 
whilst accommodating this. 
Was the ruling ‘proportionate’? 
   In assessing proportionality it is necessary to look at the consequences of the order made. If 
R v D is adopted it means that a defendant who both wishes to assert her right to manifest her 
religious belief to wear a veil in the presence of men, cannot also testify in her own defence. 
  A defendant in a criminal trial is competent although not compellable to give evidence.89As 
the judge noted ‘there is rarely, if ever a case where the Defendant’s evidence could be 
described as unimportant.’90It seems clear from the discussions in R v D, that the defendant 
was seeking to advance a positive defence which contradicted elements of the prosecution case 
and which would, if accepted as true (or possibly true), result in her acquittal. 
  If evidence is relevant it is, prima facie, admissible and the judge may only exercise an 
exclusionary discretion in respect of relevant evidence where it being tendered by the 
prosecution.91  The judge does have the power to prevent a defendant adducing irrelevant 
material or to exclude a defendant from court when their behaviour is such that it is disrupting 
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the trial (although in the latter case they will be invited to return to court to testify and will only 
be excluded if their misbehaviour continues).92 There is little to support the suggestion that 
there is a basis in law for preventing a defendant from tendering admissible, relevant evidence. 
HHJ Murphy cited the, now repealed, alibi provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 196793 as 
being an example of such an exclusionary power. However those provisions can be readily 
distinguished for a number of reasons; they were clearly set out in statute, they amounted to a 
prohibition on the defendant calling positive evidence in support of an alibi but did not prevent 
testifying per se (a defendant could still deny the offence on sworn evidence) and the behaviour 
which resulted in the sanction was not an assertion of a protected right. These provisions have 
been replaced with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act94 which, 
although intended to be more onerous in terms of the burdens of defence disclosure, removed 
the power of the court to refuse to admit alibi evidence of which the Crown has not been 
notified and have replaced it with provisions which allow the jury to draw inferences from such 
failure. 
   The ability of a defendant to be able to call evidence in their own defence does not only exist 
through the absence of exclusionary powers but is also a positive right encompassed by article 
6 of the ECHR.95 It has long been an established principle of law that allowing a party to put 
their case is an essential component of a fair trial. As Bingham LJ has commented; 
While cases may no doubt arise in which it can properly be held that denying the subject 
of a decision an adequate opportunity to put his case is not in all the circumstances unfair, 
I would expect these cases to be of great rarity.96 
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   Article 6 of the ECHR includes amongst the minimum rights of a defendant in a criminal 
case the right to ‘obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf.’ In 
testifying as to his or her defence, a defendant is acting as a witness on his own behalf and by 
preventing their evidence being heard there is a breach of this minimum right. 
   It is correct to note that the House of Lords decided in R v Jones that a trial which takes place 
in the absence of a defendant’s evidence due to their absconding does not offend the right to a 
fair trial but this is predicated on the basis that the defendant has, through their nonattendance, 
voluntarily waived his or her right to be present and give evidence.97 In R v D the judge goes 
beyond this, directing that should the defendant refuse to remove her veil not only should she 
be prohibited from giving her evidence, but also that the jury should be given a direction as to 
her failure to testify (with appropriate, unspecified, modifications). This direction, which 
derives from s35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order act 1994, permits the jury to draw an 
inference as to guilt if they conclude there is a case to answer and there is no good reason for 
the failure to testify. Although there is no detail as to how the direction would be modified, the 
judgment intimates that any discussions regarding the veil will take place in the absence of the 
jury and so it is unclear whether they would be (and were) made aware of the reasons for the 
failure to testify. The rule as expressed in statute relates to a defendant who, having heard the 
evidence adduced by the Crown, volunteers not to offer an explanation and not to one who 
wishes to offer an explanation but is prohibited from doing so. In R v Hamidi and Cherazi98the 
Court of Appeal accepted that it was not permissible to allow inferences to be drawn against a 
defendant who had voluntarily absented himself from the trial. Therefore a jury trying a case 
where a defendant has breached bail and failed to attend would be directed not to draw 
inferences from that defendant’s absence. HHJ Murphy’s ruling places a defendant who asserts 
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her right to manifest her religion in court in a more disadvantageous position than one who 
voluntarily absconds.  
 Whilst HHJ Murphy was no doubt understandably concerned about use of the veil being 
abused by defendants who sought to avoid cross examination there was no evidence that was 
so in D’s case. The combination of the prohibition on giving evidence, coupled with the 
subsequent risk of an inference, takes a defendant’s decision to remove or not remove her veil 
beyond the scope of a simple case management direction and elevates it into an evidential issue 
which can be used by the jury in their determination of the case and in doing so it has the 
potential to strengthen the prosecution case.    
   It was also necessary for the judge to be satisfied that the orders made which limited the 
defendant’s rights were no more than necessary to achieve the legitimate aims he identified. It 
was for this reason that he permitted her to retain the veil during the remainder of proceedings 
and to be shielded from the public view for such time as her veil was removed. The judge posed 
himself the rhetorical question ‘is there a less restrictive approach which would be equally 
effective in achieving the aim?’99 He did not, however, answer this question by considering the 
efficacy of alternative approaches but resolved it simply by minimising the duration of time for 
which the veil removed and restricting the number of males who could see her unveiled face. 
The judgment does not discuss alternatives to the removal of the veil whilst testifying nor assess 
the proportionality of permitting an evidential inference being drawn if she was willing to 
testify but chose not to do so without her veil. It is perhaps understandable that having begun 
the judgment with a consideration of the right to remain veiled both whilst in the dock as a 
defendant and in the witness box, and then having resolved matters in a manner which accepted 
the primacy of the defendant’s right for those parts of the trial where she was not required to 
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testify that the judge did not go on to revisit this part of the decision. But having decided that 
the problem was an evidential one, then the possibility of the conflict being resolved through a 
direction to the jury needed to be discounted before the request to remove the veil could be 
considered proportionate. 
Could a judicial direction have resolved the matter? 
One alternative approach that could have been considered is allowing the defendant to testify 
whilst wearing her veil but giving a direction to the jury in summing up that the defendant was 
exercising a protected right and that they should draw no inferences from this. One of the 
functions of the directions given by a trial judge to a jury is to direct them what matters they 
should and should not take into account. In certain cases the jury may inadvertently hear matters 
which are deemed inadmissible and prejudicial and be discharged, but in others they are trusted 
to accept the judge’s directions and consider the evidence in accordance with it. Juries are 
directed not to speculate on evidence not before them and to form their own view of the 
evidence regardless of any view the judge may appear to have. In cases where hearsay evidence 
is admitted due to the non-availability of the speaker, the exemplar direction given in the Bench 
Book reads as follows; 
You have seen, in the course of the trial, several witnesses take the oath or affirm 
and give evidence in person. …You do not have that advantage in the case of Mr 
A... You have not, therefore, as in the case of other witnesses, seen and heard his 
evidence under oath or affirmation tested in cross examination. You do not know 
how he might have responded and you must not speculate. 100 
   There are a number of difficulties which a party who is unable to challenge a contested 
witness face when that witness’s evidence is read to the court. Primarily these concern the 
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inability to extract additional oral evidence which might support the opponent’s or undermine 
the proponent’s case. Many of these difficulties are absent with a witness who is present in 
court and can answer questions under cross examination. If it is accepted that a direction can 
cure such a substantial departure from the normal convention on the presentation of witness 
evidence then, by extension, it should be able to rectify a change in departure from convention 
which is less substantial. A direction which reminded the jury that a witness (prosecution or 
defence) has a right to wear a veil and they should draw no inferences, favourable or 
unfavourable, from her doing so would have addressed the issue directly in a manner which is 
proportionate to the perceived harm it was causing. The judge did warn the jury at the outset 
of the trial not to be prejudiced against the defendant101but also made it clear that she would 
have to remove the veil if testifying.  This approach, although no doubt well intentioned was 
unhelpful as it not only drew the jury’s attention to the issue but, without further clarification, 
created a risk that the jury would see the defendant’s decision not to testify as her making a 
simple choice between asserting her innocence and removing a piece of material. Without 
further explanation as to the potential importance to the defendant of retaining the veil, her 
exercise of choice in favour of it may have been interpreted by the jury as indicative of a lack 
of interest in establishing her innocence. If a judicial direction can cure the potential imbalance 
in the evidence of the parties when a witness is absent, it must by extension, be sufficient to 
cure the difficulties where a witness is present but does not wish to remove the veil. It is of 
course the case that the deliberations of the jury are confidential102 and the extent to which 
judicial directions are followed or ignored remains a matter of conjecture. The courts can 
however only proceed on the basis that they are followed unless and until the contrary is 
proven. In the absence of any evidence that a jury could not comply with such a direction, it 
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should have been assumed that a judicial direction would have been complied with in the same 
way as any other direction and the jury could have determined the case on the basis of all the 
evidence before them, without speculating on that which was absent. This being so then there 
was a less restrictive alternative to the removal of the veil and the requirement that it be 
removed was not a legitimate limitation under article 9. 
Conclusion 
The role of the courts is to ensure that laws and rights are maintained based on accurate findings 
of fact. Perhaps more so than any other institution, a court is the place where the dividing line 
between the rights of the individual and the power of the state is tested. The rule of the judiciary 
is to decide where this line lies and not to move it. Where there is a genuine risk of the accuracy 
of the fact finding process being compromised then the judiciary should take only those steps 
that are reasonable and proportionate to address this. Addressing those issues should not have 
the effect of imposing a greater burden on any particular party than is prescribed by law. It 
should be remembered that the adversarial system has adapted to take into account the inherent 
variability of the process of giving evidence. The fact that demeanour has traditionally been 
regarded as a reliable of way of ascertaining the veracity or otherwise of a witness does not 
mean that it is necessarily essential to the fact finding process and evidence can be found that 
the court system has permitted flexibility in respect of this in certain circumstances.  
   The UK has not as a matter of primary legislation sought to outlaw the wearing of the veil in 
public. It has also accepted that a right to manifest religious beliefs is a right which is worthy 
of legal protection. If the UK wishes to restrict this it should do so through primary legislation 
and then, only with the utmost of caution. 
   The issues in R v D may be seen through the lens of the veil wearer being a defendant who, 
with hindsight, is known to be guilty of the offence she was charged with. However if it is 
equally conceivable (as NS v The Queen demonstrates) that the veil wearer could be the victim 
of violent or sexual abuse. If we adopt an approach which places assessment of demeanour at 
the core of the decision making process, then the risk of a victim of crime not seeking to engage 
the assistance and protection of the criminal justice system becomes significant as the 
vulnerable party will have to make a choice as to whether to engage in the process or 
compromise their religion. The creativity which the adversarial system has shown over time in 
ensuring that evidence is heard fairly should be deployed to ensure that removal of the veil is 
a truly exceptional course. Judges may well be concerned about the possible prejudice that a 
witness wearing a veil may inflict upon her parties case, but an approach which seeks to 
intervene through any means stronger than the giving of advice represents an unwarranted 
interference with an individual’s identity and autonomy and in doing so may marginalise the 
rights of those in need of the greatest protection. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
